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THE COURT UPHOLDS THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF THE
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL STATUTE-Morrison v.

Olson-Human rights

commentaries often discuss depressing topics such as
persecution, homelessness, exploitation, and brutality.
Although many of these topics play an essential role in
exposing the unfortunate plight of the victims, their approach
increasingly tends to be one of disaster description instead of
disaster prevention. This paper discusses not an unfortunate
"ends" of a system gone awry, but rather the "system" itself.
Morrison v. Olson' is a case which illustrates how the
constitutional system of the United States can work to improve
the accountability of our leaders through the enactment of the
independent counsel statute 2 (Act).
The Supreme Court, on the last day of the 1987 term,
upheld the validity of the Act.' The seven to one decision4
was touted as the "major constitutional clash of the year."5 It
rejected claims that the legislation authorizing court-appointed
special prosecutors infringed the president's constitutional
authority to wield the executive power by depriving him of the
power to prosecute.6
Enacted in the aftermath of Watergate and
subsequently amended by Congress,7 the independent counsel
provisions of the Act provide for the appointment of special
prosecutors from the executive branch to investigate
presidential subordinates.8 These provisions require the
1. 108 S.Ct. 2597 (1988), enforced sub. nom. In re Sealed Case, 857 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir.

1988).
2. Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-599 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
3. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2622.
4. Justice Scalia was the lone dissenter. Id at 2622-41 (Scalia, ., dissenting). See infra
text accompanying notes 155-198.
5. Stewart & Nelson, Separation of Powers, A.B.A. J.,Sept. 1, 1988, at 40.
6. Morrison, 108 S.Ct. at 2621-22.
7. The Act was first enacted by Congress in 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-521,
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (92 Stat.) 1867, as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-409,
CONG. & ADMIN. News (96 Stat.) 2039; Pub. L. No. 100-191, 1987 U.S.
ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 1293.
8. Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-599 (1982 & Supp.

1978 U.S. CODE
1982 U.S. CODE
CODE CONG. &
1987).
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Attorney General to apply to a special division of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
(Special Division) for the appointment of an independent
counsel within ninety days after commencement of an internal
preliminary investigation, or upon receiving a request to do
so from Congress, unless he determines within that period that
"there are no reasonable grounds to believe that further
investigation or prosecution is warranted."9
The litigation in Morrison arose when the House
Judiciary Committee began an investigation into the Justice
Department's role in a controversy between the House and
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)."
The
Committee eventually requested the Attorney General,
pursuant to the Act, to appoint an independent counsel to
investigate allegations that Theodore Olson, an official of the
Attorney General's Office, had given false testimony during an
earlier EPA investigation."
The Attorney General decided that further investigation
was warranted and applied to the special division." However,
a dispute arose between the litigants over the special counsel's
jurisdiction as set forth by the Attorney General; subsequently,
the alleged wrongdoers attacked the Act's constitutionality.13
The district court upheld the constitutionality of the Act. 4 A
divided court of appeals, however, reversed the district court's
decision. 5 The majority found that the method of appointing
the independent counsel "[sapped] the political vitality of the
9. Id. § 592.
10. H.R. REP. No. 435, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 5 (1985).
11. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Two other officials,
Edward Schmults, the deputy attorney general, and Carol Dinkins, the assistant Attorney
General for the Land and Natural Resource Division, were also investigated on allegations

of illegally withholding documents. Id.
12. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2606 n.11 (1988) (citing United States House
Judiciary Committee Report 22, 45 (Apr. 10, 1986), filed in No. 86-1 (C.A.D.C.) (Attorney
General Report)).
13. In re Sealed Case, 665 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1987).

14. Id.
15. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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President,"16 and also violated the appointments clause of the
17
U.S. Constitution.

As an increasing number of former Reagan officials fell
within the Act's reach, constitutional challenges became
prevalent."8 In response to these increasing challenges, the
Supreme Court decided it needed to address the issue of the
Act's constitutionality. 9 Utilizing what appears to have been
a functional and deferential approach, 20 the Morrison Court
21
upheld the constitutional validity of the Act.
This comment will explain the the impetus behind the
22
Act, its statutory requirements,' the Court of Appeals'
decision interpreting the Act, 24 and the Supreme Court
decision.' An attempt to put Morrison's political and legal
significance into perspective will also be included. 26 The
separation of powers doctrine is an elusive, abstract area of
16. Id. at 508.
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2 provides "[The President] shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law:
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." Id.
(emphasis added).
18. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case (North), 829 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Oliver North).
19. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2595, 2602-07 (1988).
20. For a general discussion of formal versus functional methods of analyzing separation
of powers controversies, see Bruff, On the ConstitutionalStatus of the Administrative Agencies,
36 AM. U.L. REV. 491 (1987). See also, Carter, The Confirmation Mess, 102 HARV. L. REv.
1185 (1988), where the article classifies the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on separation of
powers as a mixture of two traditions: the first, entitled the evolutionary tradition, holds that
as the needs of the nation change over time, the Congress may guide the evolution of fresh
institutional forms to meet these changing needs. Id. at 1218. The second, entitled the deevolutionary tradition, holds that the constitutional scheme of balanced and separated powers
should be used as a brake on efforts to alter the form of government that the Framers
envisioned. Id. at 1208.
21. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
22. See infra tet accompanying notes 29-40.
23. See infra text
accompanying notes 41-78.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 79-90.
25. See infra tet accompanying notes 91-198.
26. See infra tet accompanying notes 199-218.
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constitutional law.' The special prosecutor law "[b]ecame a
surrogate for this debate, a symbol of the current round in the
age-old struggle for dominance between Congress and the
White House."'
I.

IMPETUS BEHIND THE INDEPENDENT
COUNSEL STATUTE

Scandal in the upper echelons of our federal
government has been a recurring problem throughout history. 9
The Act, by creating a special prosecutor independent of any
influence, "responds to a structural feature of the executive
branch that hampers prosecution of high-level misconduct."'
The problem, as one commentator noted, lies in the dual
nature of the attorney general's role:
On the one hand, he [the attorney general] is
the nation's chief law enforcement officer,
expected to investigate and prosecute federal
crimes dispassionately. On the other, as the
administration's highest ranking legal adviser, he
is ordinarily a political and personal confidant of
the President and his circle, providing advice on
both law and policy. Therefore, allegations of
misconduct in high places often cast the Attorney
General in the deeply troubling role of
investigating close political and personal
associates."
27. J. NowA, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW 122 (3rd ed. 1986).
28. Greenhouse, Fetters on the Executive, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1988, at A19, col. 2
[hereinafter Greenhouse].
29. See, e.g., R. WOODWARD & C. BERNSTEIN, ALL THE PRESIDENT' MEN (1974); B.
NoGGLE, TEAPOT DOME: OIL AND POLITICS IN THE 1920's (1962); L. COOLIDGE, THE LIFE
OF ULYSSES S.GRANT (1922) ("The Whiskey Ring Affair").
30. Bruff, Independent Counsel and the Constitution, 24 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 539, 54142 (1988) [hereinafter Bruffq.

31. Id. at 541-42.
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Perhaps the best illustration of this inherent dilemma occurred
during the Nixon Administration's famous "Saturday night
massacre. 3 2 The Attorney General and his Deputy resigned
rather than execute the President's order to discharge
Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox for his
investigation of the President.33 In the aftermath of public
outrage, Congress began to deliberate on what became the
independent counsel statute.3
Legislative history suggests that Congress thought these
inherent conflicts within the Attorney General's office should
be dealt with in the same manner in which the private bar
addresses such conflicts of interest.3
For example, when
private attorneys are involved with a conflict of interest, the
American Bar Association suggests that attorneys recuse
themselves. 36 Congress reasoned that the government should
strive, as do private attorneys, to avoid even the appearance
of impropriety, because such a perception may undermine the
public's confidence in the Department of Justice and damage
the legitimacy of the executive branch. 37
While the Act's purposes may be laudable, statutory
special prosecutors present constitutional difficulties. The
practical significance of appointing these prosecutors is to
redistribute prosecutorial power.' As Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained in the Court's opinion in Morrison:
Congress

.

.

. was concerned when it

32. See L.JAWORSKY, THE RIGHT AND ThE POWER 2 (1976).
33. See id. See also Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973).
34. S.REP. No. 170, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 4216, 4218 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 170].
35. S.REP. No. 170, supra note 34, at 7,1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 4222.
36. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 comment (1983) which
states "[a] lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed

competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to completion." Id.
37. S.REP. No. 170, supra note 34, at 7, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4222.
38. See Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2611 (1988).
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created the office of independent counsel
with the conflicts of interest that could
arise in situations when the Executive
Branch is called upon to investigate its
own high-ranking officers. If it were to
remove the appointing authority from the
Executive Branch, the most logical place
to put it was in the Judicial Branch.3 9
To overcome the separation of powers hurdle, Congress
created an independent counsel who possessed considerable
autonomy, yet retained some relation to the executive
branch.4"
The Independent Counsel Statute
The independent counsel statute 41 requires that the
Attorney General must conduct a preliminary investigation of
the matter upon receipt of information that he determines is
"[s]ufficient to constitute grounds to investigate whether any
person [covered by the Act] may have violated any Federal
criminal law."42 When the attorney general has completed this
investigation, 43 or after 90 days has elapsed, 4 he is required to
report to a special three member court 5 created by the Act
"for the purpose of appointing independent counsels. 46

If the Attorney General determines that "there are no
reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is
warranted, '47 then he must notify the special division of this
39. Id.
40. S.REP. No. 170, supra note 34, at 7, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 4221.
41. Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-599 (1982 & Supp. 1987).

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. § 591(a).
Id. § 592(c)(1)(A).
Id. § 592(a)(1).
Id.
Id. § 49(a).
Id. § 592(b)(1).
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result.48 In such a case "the division of the court shall have
no power to appoint an independent counsel."4 9 However, if

the Attorney General has determined that there are
itreasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is
warranted,"5 then he is required to "apply to the division of
the court for the appointment of an independent counsel. 51
In conducting preliminary investigations, the Attorney
General does not have authority to convene grand juries, plea
bargain, grant immunity, or issue subpoenas.5 2 A further
limitation on his power is that he cannot base a determination
that there are "no reasonable grounds to investigate or
prosecute"53 due to the fact that the person lacked the state
of mind required to violate the law, unless there is clear and
convincing evidence indicating otherwise."
The Act grants the counsel full power and independent
authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial
functions and powers of the Attorney General or any other
officer or employee of the Department of Justice. 5 Persons
under the jurisdiction of the counsel may include: the
President, the Vice President, any person working in the
executive office of the President who is paid at a level II
rate5 6 or above, anyone in the Justice Department who is paid
at a level III rate57 or above, the Director and Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, and the chairman or treasurer of a national
presidential campaign committee. 8
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id. § 592(c)(1)(A).
Id. § 592(c)(1).
Id. § 592(a)(2)(A).
Id. § 592(a)(2)(B)(i).
Id. § 592(a)(2)(B)(ii).
Id. § 594(a).
Id. § 591(b)(3).
Id.
Id. § 591(b)(5).
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The functions of the independent counsel include
conducting grand jury proceedings and other investigations,
participating in civil and criminal court proceedings and
litigation, and appealing decisions in which the counsel
participates in an official capacity. 9 The Act states that an
independent counsel "[s]hall, except where not possible,
comply with written or other established policies of the
Department of Justice respecting enforcement of criminal
laws."' In addition, whenever a matter has been referred to
an independent counsel under the Act, the Attorney General
and Justice Department are required to suspend all
investigations and proceedings regarding the matter.61
An independent counsel appointed pursuant to the Act
can only be removed from office by the Attorney General,
unless the removal is by impeachment and conviction.62 Also,
an appointed independent counsel can only be removed for
good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other
condition that substantially impairs the performance of
counsel's duties.63 If the independent counsel is removed, the
Attorney General is required to submit a report to both the
special division and the Judiciary Committees of the Senate
and House "specifying the facts found and the ultimate
grounds for such removal."' Additionally, the independent
counsel may seek judicial review of the removal in a civil
action commenced in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia." As of the 1987 amendments, however,
the special division may not hear or determine any such civil
action or any appeal of a decision in such a civil action.'
However, the independent counsel may be reinstated or
59. Id. § 594(a)(1)-(3).
60. Id. § 594(0.

61. Id. § 597(a).
62. Id. § 596(a)(1) (emphasis added).
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id. § 596(a)(2).
65. Id. § 596 (a)(3).

66. Id.
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granted other appropriate relief by order of the court.6 7
The office of independent counsel terminates when he
notifies the Attorney General that he has completed or
substantially completed any investigation or prosecutions
undertaken pursuant to the Act. 8 In addition, the special
division, acting either on its own or on the suggestion of the
Attorney General, may terminate the office of an independent
counsel at any time if it finds that "[t]he investigation of all
matters within the prosecutorial jurisdiction of the counsel
have been completed or so substantially completed that it
would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to
complete such investigations and prosecutions. 69
The Act provides for congressional oversight of the
activities of the counsel.7"
If requested, an independent
counsel must periodically send to Congress statements or
reports on his activities.71 The "appropriate committees of
Congress"" are given oversight jurisdiction in regard to the
conduct of an independent counsel, and the counsel is
required by the Act to cooperate with Congress in the exercise
of this jurisdiction.73 Furthermore, the counsel is required to
inform the House of "[s]ubstantial and credible information
which [the counsel] receives ... that may constitute grounds
for impeachment [of high level executive officials]."74
Finally, the Act gives certain Congressional committee
members the power to "[r]equest in writing that the Attorney
General apply for the appointment of an independent
counsel."75 The Attorney General is required to respond to
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
Id. § 596(b)(1).
Id. § 596(b)(2).
Id. § 595.
Id. § 595(a)(2).
Id. § 595(a)(1).
Id. § 595(a)(1).
Id. § 595(c).
Id. § 592(g)(1).
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this request within a specified time,76 but is not required to
accede to the request.77
The creation of the independent prosecutor for the
investigation and prosecution of high level misconduct raises
serious constitutional issues, and involves both the integrity
and the effectiveness of our government. The Act is a careful
attempt to balance competing considerations.78
]I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION

Writing for the 2-1 majority, 79 Judge Silberman stated
it was significant that the law "[w]as passed in the midst of a
period when one political party tended to control the
Presidency and the other enjoyed dominance in the legislative
branch."
Reversing the district court opinion,81 Judge
Silberman opined that the appointment of a special prosecutor
"[s]urely saps the political vitality of the Presidency and
thereby renders the President a less effective political force
juxtaposed against Congress. 82 Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals found the Act unconstitutional as an impermissible
interference upon executive branch power.8 3
The Silberman decision held first that an independent
counsel is not an "inferior officer" of the United States, but
rather a "principal" one for the purposes of the Appointments
Clause 4 due to the nature of her duties, and that therefore,
76. Id. § 592(g)(2).

77. Id. § 592(b).
78. Bruff, supra note 30, at 541.
79. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
80. Id. at 506 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164-67, 175 (1926)); See also
Greenhouse, supra note 28, at A19, col. 3.
81. In re Sealed Case, 665 F. Supp. 56 (D.D.C. 1987) (Chief Judge Aubrey Robinson held

the Act to be constitutional in that it represented Congress' measured response to the
recurrent question of how to enforce laws when they are violated by high ranking officials in
matters where the Department of Justice has apparent conflicts of interest. Id.).
82. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
83. Id. at 496-519.

84. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2. See supra note 17.
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the Act is invalid because it does not provide for the counsel
to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate."5
In addition, the opinion believed that the statute
violated the concept of separation of powers embodied in the
Constitution." According to the majority,
[C]ourt appointment of prosecutors presents a
more fundamental incongruity with our
constitutional scheme than virtually any other
type of inter-branch appointment, because it
blurs that cherished separation of prosecutor and
judge which is a crucial aspect of the
Constitution's protection of individual liberty.87
The majority also criticized the statute's functional
restrictions on the executive removal power.' It noted that
the Act placed further restrictions on the President's removal
and supervisory powers, including an extraordinarily broad
provision authorizing the judiciary to review removal decisions
of the Attorney General and explicit limitations on the
Attorney General's authority to supervise the independent
counsel.89 "Good cause" restrictions and judicial review of
core executive branch powers to remove its officers, according
to the majority, unconstitutionally precluded the power of the
president to exercise any influence over the independent
counsel and hence also removed political accountability. 90

85. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 484-89.
86. Id. at 496.

87. Id.
88. id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 488-89.
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THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

A. Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist's 7 to 1 opinion9 reversed the
court of appeals' decision92 and upheld the Act's statutory
provisions.93 The Chief Justice reversed the lower court by
stating that the appointment of a special prosecutor by the
courts was valid under the Constitution's provision that "the
Congress by Law may vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper. 94
In support of this
proposition, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited U.S. v. Germaine95
where the Court held:
The Constitution for purposes of appointment
very clearly divides all its officers into two
classes. The primary class requires nomination
by the President and confirmation by the Senate.
But foreseeing that when offices became
numerous, and sudden removals necessary, this
mode might be inconvenient, it was provided
that, in regard to officers inferior to those
specifically mentioned, Congress might by law
vest their appointment in the President alone, in
the Courts of law, or in the heads of
departments. 96
He rejected arguments that the special prosecutors' powers
were so broad that they were not inferior officers. 97
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Morrison v. Olson, 108 S.Ct. 2597 (1988).
Id. at 2622.
Id.
Id. at 2609-10 (quoting U.S. CONsr. Art. II, § 2, cl.
2).
Id. at 2608 (citing United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 508 (1879)).
Genaine, 9 U.S. at 509-10.
Morrivon, 108 S.Ct. at 2608.
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The Court found four attributes of the independent
counsel which made this position "inferior": first, the Court
found persuasive the fact that the Act authorizes the
independent counsel's removal by the Attorney General,
making the counsel, to some degree, "inferior" in rank and
authority;9" second, because the counsel is empowered to
perform only certain limited duties, restricted primarily to
investigation and, if appropriate, prosecution, his office is
inferior;" third, his jurisdiction is inferior because it is limited
to that which has been granted by the Special Division
pursuant to a request by the Attorney General; 0 and finally,
because the counsel's office is temporary in the sense that he
is appointed essentially to accomplish a single task, and when
that task is over the office is terminated."'1 Accordingly,
appointment by the court, instead of by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate, was proper.'02
The Court found no merit to the argument that even
if the independent counsel is an inferior officer, the
appointments clause does not empower Congress to place the
appointment of such an officer outside the Executive
Branch.0 '
The Court reasoned that as long as such
appointments were not incongruous to the general tripartite
10 4
scheme, then inter-branch appointments were constitutional.
The Appointment Clause's reference to inferior officers,
according to the opinion, admits of no limitation on
interbranch appointments. 1 5
It gives Congress ample
discretion to determine whether it is proper to vest the
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
rejected

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2609.
Id. at 2608-09.
Id. at 2608-13.
Id. at 2608-09. See also Er pane Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879), where the Court
an argument that federal judges could not appoint commissioners to serve on an

election board which would oversee certain elections. Id. at 397-98; U.S. v. Solomon, 216

F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
104. Mon-ison, 108 s. Ct. at 2608-09.
105. Id. at 2611.
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appointment of executive officers in the courts of law. 1"
When Congress created the office of independent counsel, it
was concerned with the conflicts of interest that could arise in
situations where the executive branch is called upon to
investigate its own high ranking officers." 7 The most logical

place for Congress to put the appointing authority, the Court
held, was in the judicial branch."

The majority did not

believe this exercise of power was an abuse of Congressional
discretion."
The second major prong of Chief Justice Rehnquist's
opinion was that the limited legal powers given to the special
three-judge division to choose a special prosecutor, and to
exercise limited supervision, did not involve judges in matters
inconsistent with their duties under Article III1 of the
Constitution."1 Although the Chief Justice admitted that the
express provision of Article III limited the judicial power of
1 2 he reminded
the United States to "Cases and Controversies,""

the challengers that the Appointments Clause 1 3 is a source of
106. Id. However, the Court did not mean to imply that there are not other limitations
to interbranch appointments. See, e.g., Exparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 398 (1879).
107. S. REP. No. 170, supra note 34, at 7, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at
4244.
108. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2611.

109. Id.
110. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority; - to all cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a party; - to Controversies between two or more
states; - between a State and Citizens of another state; - between Citizens
of different States; - between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or subjects.
Id
111. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2615. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated "[w]e think both the
special court and it's judges are sufficiently isolated by these statutory provisions from the
review of the activities of the independent counsel so as to avoid any of the independence of
the judiciary such as would render the Act invalid under Article Ill." Id.
112. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See supra note 110.
113. See supra note 17.
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authority for judicial action that is independent of Article
III."4 Moreover, the Chief Justice asserted that the special
division's appointments clause powers encompass the power to
define the independent counsel's jurisdiction.1 5 The Court
reasoned that when Congress creates a temporary office, the
nature of which will vary with the factual circumstances giving
rise to the need for an appointment, it may vest the powers
to define the office's scope in the court as incident to the
appointment of the counsel pursuant to the Appointments
Clause.116
Additionally, the Chief Justice noted that Article III
does not absolutely bar Congress from vesting certain
miscellaneous powers in the Special Division under the Act."t7
Here, the special division's miscellaneous powers, such as the
passive powers to receive but not to act on or specifically
approve various reports from the special counsel or the
Attorney General, do not encroach upon Executive Branch
The Court pointed out that these miscellaneous
authority."
powers are "directly analogous to functions federal judges
perform in other contexts."11 9
The majority was more doubtful about the Special
Division's power to terminate the office of independent
counsel because such power ordinarily would not be
considered judicial.1 20 However, the Court did not view this
power to be a "significant judicial encroachment upon the
114. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2612.

115. Id. at 2613.
116. Id. at 2612-13. The Court, however, did not think that Congressional power was
unlimited. See id. at 2613. ("In order for the Division's definition of the counsel's jurisdiction
to be truly 'incidental' to its power to appoint, the jurisdiction that the court decides upon

must be demonstrably related to the factual circumstances that gave rise to the Attorney
General's investigation and request for the appointment of the independent counsel in the
particular case." Id.).

117. Id.
118. Id. at 2613.
119.

Id. at 2614.

For example, deciding whether- to allow disclosure of information

before a grand jury, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), to extend a grand jury investigation, see FED.
R. CRIM. P. 6(g), or to award attorney's fees, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
120. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2614.
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executive power or upon the prosecutorial discretion of the
independent counsel." ' In support of its rationale, the Court
noted that the Act's termination provisions do not give the
special division the power to remove the counsel while an
investigation or court proceeding is still underway;1 2 rather,
this type of power is only vested in the Attorney General.1"
Furthermore, because the Act gives the special division no
power to review any of the counsel's or Attorney General's
actions, there is. no risk of partisan or bias adjudication of
claims regarding the independent counsel which would
invalidate the Act.1 24
The third major prong of the holding stated that the
law's limitation on the Attorney General's power to remove
special prosecutors did not violate the constitutional principle
of separation of powers.12'
The Court held that
"[n]otwithstanding the fact that the counsel is to some degree
'independent' and free from Executive Branch supervision to
a greater extent than other federal prosecutors . . . the Act

give[s] the Executive Branch sufficient control over the
independent counsel to ensure that the President is able to
perform his constitutionally assigned duties." 26 Also, the
Court noted that while the doctrine of separation of powers
is entrenched in constitutional law, it has never held that the
"Constitution requires that the three Branches
of Government
'operate with absolute independence'. " 127
The Court broke its separation of powers analysis into
two issues: first, "[w]hether the provision of the Act restricting
the Attorney General's power to remove the independent
counsel to only those instances in which he can show good
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2615. The Court noted that advisory opinions and special orders are outside

both the Act and the Constitution, and are contrary to judicial power under Article I1. Id.
125. Id. at 2620-22.
126. Id. at 2622.

127. Id. at 2620 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 684, 707 (1974)).
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cause,128 taken by itself, impermissibly interferes with the
President's exercise of his constitutionally appointed
functions"; 129 and second, whether "[t]aken as a whole, the Act
violates the separation of powers by reducing the President's
ability to control the prosecutorial powers wielded by the
independent counsel."1"
The majority resolved issue one by finding no
impermissible interference."' The fact that Congress did not
attempt to retain any role in removal was significant in their
analysis. 3 2 Unlike past unconstitutional forays into Executive
removal power, 33 Congress legislated the independent counsel
statute with more foresight, by allowing for removal "[o]nly by
the personal action of the Attorney General, and only for
good cause."1" Notwithstanding, the practical limits that a
good cause standard thrusts upon the Executive, the Court
found the restriction essential to its continued independence.
Furthermore, the Court did not believe that the "[p]resident's
need to control the exercise of such discretion was central to
the functioning of the Executive Branch to require as a matter
of constitutional law that the counsel be terminable at will by
the President."1 35 The majority found that such diminished
control did not interfere with his duty to "take care that the
laws be faithfully executed,"1" and dispensed with any notion
that because prosecution may be labelled as a purely executive
128. Id. at 2616; See also 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1)'(1982 & Supp. 1987).
129. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2616.

130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id. at 2620.
Id.
See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.

52 (1926).
134. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1987).

135. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2619.
136. U.S. CONsr. art. II § B.

364

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. VII

137
power any limit on that power would be forbidden.
Taken as a whole, the Court found the statute did not
violate the separation of powers.'3 Neither the Congress nor
the Judiciary was found to have been given usurped Executive
power through the Act. 39 Although the Act does empower
certain members of Congress to request the Attorney General
to apply for an appointment, the Attorney General has no
duty to comply with such a request.140 His only restriction is
that he must respond within a certain time limit. 41 Congress'
only other 2 involvement is to conduct its regular oversight

functions. 1

The Special Division of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit may only become involved at the
request of the Attorney General 4 3 whose decision not to
pursue the route of independent counsel is not reviewable in
any Court. 4 In addition, once the court has appointed a
137. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2618. The Morrison Court, by no longer relying on such
terms as "quasi-legislative" and "quasi-judicial," suggested a departure from previous modes of
separation of powers analysis. Id. See generally Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295
U.S. 602 (1935) ("[w]hether Congress can condition the President's power of removal... will
depend upon the character of the office and rest[s] upon the distinction between purely
executive, and quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power." Id.). See also Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714 (1986). Bowsher was the last separation of powers case to be addressed by the
Court before Morrison. The case involved an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to gain
a role in the removal of the Comptroller General empowered to recommend budget cuts in
accordance with the "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act," 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (1982 & Supp.
1986). The Court found that the official's functions were executive in nature, in that he was
required to exercise judgment concerning facts that affect the application of the Act, and must
interpret the provisions of the Act to determine precisely what budgetary calculations are
required. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 722. The Bowsher court did not base its decision on purely
executive versus quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial analysis, but rather relied upon a formal
restriction that Congress may not administer its own laws. Id.
Morrison is distinguished because Congress has no power over the administration of the
independent counsel statute. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2621. Similar to any other law,
Congress wrote the restrictions to the statute's application, but the Executive Branch is the
only one charged with its enforcement subject to Judicial review. Id.
138. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2620-22.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 2621.
141. Id. at 2605. See also 28 U.S.C. § 592(g) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
142. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2605; 28 U.S.C. § 595(a) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
144. 28 U.S.C. § 592(f) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
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counsel and defined the jurisdiction, it has no power to
supervise or control the activities of the counsel. 45 As for the
removal check on the Attorney General, the Court reasoned
that even though "[t]he Act does give a federal ,court the
power to review the Attorney General's decision to remove an
independent counsel, . . . in our view this is a function well

within the traditional power of the judiciary."'46
Finally, the Court found that although the Act does not
allow the Attorney General to appoint the individual of his
choice,'47 or to determine the counsel's jurisdiction,1 48 and it
limits his power of removal, 49 "[t]he Act does give the
Attorney General several means of supervising and controlling
the prosecutorial powers that may be wielded by an
independent counsel."' 50 Because powers of initiation,' fact
gathering, 5 2 and removal 53 were still retained by the
Executive, the Court found it unnecessary to strike down the
statute.54
B. Dissenting Opinion
Standing alone, Justice Scalia believed the Act was
violative of the separation of powers doctrine and hence,
unconstitutional. 55 Espousing a theoretical underpinning
which viewed the coordinate branches as discrete and nonblending, except where otherwise expressly provided in the
constitution, Justice Scalia believed the Act departs from the
145. See, eg., 28 U.S.C. §§ 593(b)(3), 594(a), 594(h)(i) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
146. Morrison, 108 S.Ct. at 2621.

147. Id See, e.g, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591(c), 592(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
148. Morrison, 108 S.Ct. at 2621; 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
149. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2621; 28 U.S.C. § 596 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
150. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2621.
151. Morrison, 108 S.Ct. at 2621; 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
152. Morrison, 108 S.Ct. at 2621; 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
153. Morrison, 108 S.Ct. at 2621; 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1987).
154. Morrison, 108 S.Ct. at 2621-22

28 U.S.C. § 594(f (1982 & Supp. 1987).
155. Morrison, 108 S.Ct. at 2631 (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
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founding fathers intent:
The Court devotes most of its attention to such
relatively technical details as the Appointments
Clause and the removal power, addressing briefly,
and only at the end of its opinion the separation
of powers doctrine ....

I think that [order] has

it backwards. Thus, while I will subsequently
discuss why our appointments and removal
jurisprudence does not support today's holding,
I begin with a consideration of the fountainhead
of that jurisprudence, the separation and
equilibrium of powers."5 6
To illustrate this point, Justice Scalia noted that the
doctrine is repeatedly expressed in the first section of each of
the first three articles of the Constitution.'57 In particular,
Justice Scalia cites the relevent section of Article II which
says, "[t]he executive Powers shall be vested in a President of
the United States."'5'
From this quotation, Justice Scalia
argued that, "this does not mean some of the executive power,
but all of the executive power."'59 Justice Scalia seems to take
a more simplistic view of the separation of powers doctrine.
He confines his analysis to two fundamental questions: "[i]s
the conduct of a criminal prosecution (and investigation to
decide whether to prosecute) the exercise of purely executive
power?"'" and "[d]oes the statute deprive the President of
'
exclusive control over the exercise of that power?"161
Justice
Scalia believed that the majority appeared to answer both
questions in the affirmative, yet sought to avoid the inevitable
156. Id. at 2625.
157. Id. at 2622.
158. ld at 2626 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.).

159. Id. at 2626 (emphasis in original text).
160. Id.
161. Id.
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conclusion that because the statute vests some purely executive
power in a person who is not the President, it is therefore
void. 6 2

The dissent opined that the majority's decision effects
a revolution in constitutional jurisprudence. The decision
allows the Court, once it has determined that purely executive
functions are at issue, and that those functions have been
given to a person whose actions are not fully within the
supervision and control of the President, to nonetheless
proceed further and determine whether the President's need
to control the exercise of the person's discretion is "so central
to the functioning of the Executive Branch as to require
'
complete control."163
Justice Scalia writes:
[w]hether the "Act give[s] the Executive Branch
sufficient control over the independent counsel
to ensure that the President is able to perform
his constitutionally assigned duties"

. . .

is not for

us to determine, and we have never presumed to
determine, how much of the purely executive
powers of government must be within the full
control of the President.
The Constitution
prescribes that they all are."6
Justice Scalia refuted the legislature's conflict of
interest rationale1 65 by asserting that "[w]hile the separation of
powers may prevent us from righting every wrong, it does so
in order to ensure that we do not lose liberty."1 He believed
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2628.
164. Id. at 2628 (quoting majority opinion at 2621) (emphasis added).

165. See supra text accompanying notes 35-40.
166. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2629. ("Is it unthinkable that the President should have
exclusive power, even when alleged crimes by him or his close associates are at issue? No
more so than that Congress should have the exclusive power of legislation, even when what
is at issue is its own exemption from the burdens of certain laws. No more so than that this
Court should have the exclusive power to pronounce the final decision on justiciable cases and
controversies, even those pertaining to the constitutionality of a statute reducing the salaries

368

JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Vol. VII

that both the impeachment power of Congress and the voting
booth were the means by which the Framers had intended to
check any executive abuses.167

Also, he believed that the

majority effectively replaced a clear constitutional prescription
that the executive power belongs to the President with what
he termed to be a balancing test. 168 Justice Scalia believed
that such a balancing test is beyond the constitutional
mandate, and that a case-by-case analysis of the type used by
the majority would lead to the blurring of lines between the
three branches.169
Justice Scalia also believed that it was important to
note the events leading up to the Morrison litigation.17 The
case began when the Legislative and Executive Branches
became "embroiled in a dispute concerning the scope of
congressional investigatory power."'71 Olson and others were
charged by the House Judiciary Committee for not
cooperating with Congressional oversight hearings with regard
to various internal Environmental Protection Agency
documents which he was accused of improperly withholding.'72
The Committee conducted a two and one-half year
investigation of the Justice Department's role in the
controversy and issued a 3,000 page report. 73 The Committee
then made a formal request for the appointment of an
independent counsel.'74 As a practical matter, Justice Scalia
believed, the Attorney General had little choice but to seek
of the Justices." Id.).
167. Id.

168. Id
169. Id. at 2630.
170. Id. at 2623-24.
171. Id. at 2623 (quoting United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150,
152 (D.D.C. 1983)).
172. See id. at 2624 (citing United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150,
152 (D.D.C. 1983)). See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
173. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2624 (citing United States v. House of Representatives, 556
F. Supp. 150, 152 (D.D.C. 1983)).

174. See id. (citing United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 152
(D.D.C. 1983)).
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appointment given the "no reasonable grounds to believe
standard.""5 The statute compels certain action from the
Attorney General which in essence "deprive[s] the President
of substantial control over the prosecutory functions performed
by the independent counsel, and does substantially affect the
'17 6
balance of powers."
The power to decide when to prosecute, Scalia
reasoned, was one of the "natural advantages the Constitution
gave to the Presidency, just as it gave Members of Congress"
legislative immunity.1 77 To disturb this planned balance, as
Scalia perceived it, through the enactment of the statute, was
unconstitutional.17 ' According to Scalia, the impact of this
change would be that:
[B]esides weakening the Presidency by reducing
the zeal of his staff, it must also be obvious that
the institution of the independent counsel
enfeebles him more directly in his constant
confrontations with Congress, by eroding his
public support. Nothing is so politically effective
as the ability to charge that one's opponent and
his associates are not merely wrong-headed,
naive, [and] ineffective, but, in all probability,
crooks.179

The dissenting opinion also argued that the Act should
be invalidated because the independent counsel is not an
inferior officer, and hence requires "advice and consent"
appointment as a principle officer." 0 Justice Scalia criticized
the majority's reasoning for ruling the counsel inferior by
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See id. at 2624 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 592(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1987)).
Id. at 2631.
Id. at 2630.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2635.
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raising three points: first, removability by the executive branch
is not significant where there are good cause restrictions on
the Attorney General."' In this regard, Justice Scalia notes
that "[m]ost [if not all] principal officers in the Executive
Branch may be removed by the President at will.' He could
see no reason "how the fact that [the independent counsel] is
more difficult to remove than most principal officers helps to
18 3
establish that she is an inferior officer."'
Second, Justice Scalia argued that the Court
mischaracterized the extent of the counsel's power by labeling
them as "limited."'' Rather, Scalia believed that where the
"[a]ct delegates . .. 'full power and independent authority to

exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and
powers of the Department of Justice',"i" 5 the independent
counsel's powers are not truly "limited."'8 6
Finally, Justice
Scalia noted that there is nothing unusual about the counsel's
tenure which makes the position "inferior."'8 7 He pointed out
that the independent counsel continues as long as there is
work to complete, and that they often serve longer terms than
many cabinet members."' In summation to this argument,
Justice Scalia wrote, "[b]ecause appellant is not subordinate to
another officer, she is not an 'inferior' officer and her
appointment other than by the President with the advice and
'
consent of the Senate is unconstitutional." 89

181. d. at 2632.
182. Id. (emphasis in original text).
183. Id.

184. id.
185. Id. (quoting majority opinion at 2632).

186. id.
187. Id. at 2633.

188. Id.
189. Id. at 2635. (citing DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (S. Johnson 6th ed.
1785) which was used at the time of the Constitutional Convention to determine what the
framers intended by the word "inferior." Justice Scalia found "subordinate" as the definition
of "inferior" inside the pages of the dictionary. Id.)

COMMENTS

19891

371

The dissent also attacked the majority's new "present
considered view" standard.' 90 Justice Scalia believed that what
the Court is essentially saying to the President with this new
standard is, "trust us, we will make sure that you are able to
accomplish your constitutional role."191 Justice Scalia felt that
the Constitution gives the President more protection. 92
As a final point, Justice Scalia believed that the Act
removes such investigations and prosecutions from political
'
accountability. 193 "Under our system of government,"194
he
argued, "the primary check against prosecutorial abuse is a
political one."'9g

He found it significant that the power to

appoint and define jurisdiction was removed from the
President and transferred to an unelected panel of judges with
inevitable political prejudices."% Justice Scalia concluded his
dissenting opinion by stating:
[T]oday's decision on the basic issue of
fragmentation of executive power is ungoverned
by rule, and hence ungoverned by law. It
extends into the very heart of our most
significant constitutional function the 'totality of
circumstances' mode of analysis that this Court
has in recent years become fond of the ad hoc
approach to constitutional adjudication is
guaranteed to produce a result, [based on] what
the majority thinks, taking all things into account,
it ought to be. I prefer to rely upon the
judgment of the wise men who constructed our
system, and of the people who approved it, and
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

196.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
d
Id
Id. at

2636-37 (quoting majority opinion at 2618).
2637.
2637-40.

2639.
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of two centuries of history that have shown it to
be sound.197
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision upholding the law on
independent prosecutors will probably be looked upon as a
"[f]ootnote to history, ratifying one of the major legacies of
the Watergate experience.""19
As one commentator has
remarked, "[T]he Court removed all lingering doubt about the
constitutionality of the steps Congress took to spare the
country the trauma of a repetition of the Saturday Night
massacre in which President Nixon ordered the dismissal of
the Watergate special prosecutor. ' 9
Notwithstanding the abstract persuasiveness and cogency
of Justice Scalia's dissent, the Court appears to have reached
the correct result. At stake in this decision was "[t]he status
of a key structural change in the functioning of government
regarding investigatory and prosecutory powers."2 ° The
structural change implemented however, clearly appears to be
constitutional.0 Although the Act has the practical effect of
removing power from the President and the Executive
Branch, this change in structure is nonetheless acceptable
because that power was only "diluted" and not destroyed.2 2
Also, any attempt at expansion of the office in a manner
inconsistent with its present form may subject the Act to
23
successful attacks. 0
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. at 2641 (emphasis in original text).
Greenhouse, supra note 28, at Al, col. 4.
Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 94-109.

202. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2621-22 (1988) (Chief Justice Rehnquist stating
that "[n]otwithstanding the fact that counsel is to some degree 'independent' and free from
Executive supervision to a greater extent than other federal prosecutors, in our view these
features of the Act give the Executive Branch sufficient control over the independent counsel
to ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties." Id.).

203. Id. at 2615.
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The validity of the Act is also strengthened by the fact
that no single other branch, particularly Congress, 4 is the sole
recipient of this power.2° Moreover, even though the role of
the judicial branch was undoubtedly increased by the Act, the
Court found ample support in past precedent which permitted
this increased role.2
The Morrison decision was considered "a stinging
political and philosophical blow"2 7 to both formalists2"8 and

executive supremacists.'t
Notwithstanding their concerns, it
is important to remember that the core executive functions of
initiation and removal of the independent counsel still remain
with the Executive Branch.210 Moreover, despite rather
stringent restrictions over Executive control of the counsel, its
office is truly limited in nature and subject to scrutiny.21 1

Baseless allegations will be checked just as they presently are
by the Judiciary. The importance of the Act is that it
provides the mechanism with which to trigger a needed
investigation where the claims of foul play are not baseless.
Despite an inevitable erosion of executive discretion
over "in-house" prosecutorial power, 212 the Act is a limited and
cautious response to the growing charges of impropriety which
have plagued the upper echelons of the federal government.213
The independent counsel statute is both an ethical and
democratic response to the perceived need to "clean up"
national politics. When a society is governed by rules of law,
rather than by rules of "men," public officials are also expected
204. Id. ("Unlike Bowsher and Myers [whose statutes were struck down], this case does
not involve an attempt by Congress itself to gain a role in the removal of executive officials
other than its established powers of impeachment and conviction." Id.).

205. See supra text accompanying notes 138-42.
206. Morrison, 108 S.Ct. at 2620-21.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Greenhouse, supra note 28, at Al, col. 5.
See supra note 20.
Greenhouse, supra note 28, at Al, col. 5.
See supra notes 151-54.
See supra notes 99-102.
See supra text accompanying notes 125-27.
See, e.g., In re Sealed Case (North), 829 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Oliver North).
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to act according to the command of these rules. 214
The
independent counsel is an effective vehicle with which to
ensure such compliance with minimal impediments upon
established doctrines of constitutional law.
James Madison, one of the foremost authorities on
original intent, pointed out that a fundamental goal of the
Constitution was to "control abuse of government.1215 In a
piognant statement on the countervailing effects of power,
Madison wrote: "[a]mbition must be made to counteract
ambition . . . If men were angels, no government would be

necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
216
internal controls on government would be necessary."
Knowing that certain checks must be instilled in any system
of government to curtail political abuse, it can be said that
Madison would have endorsed the independent counsel as a
constitutionally viable, and perhaps necessary, means of
obtaining this end.217

Human rights begin at home. The executive branch must
be held to the same degree of accountability over the laws as
the rest of the American people. By legislating the Act,
Congress maintained a consistency with both the legislative
intent of the framers and the greater good of the country.

Upholding the validity of the Act was a sound decision by the
Court.
J. Andrew Kinsey
214. See THE FEDERAuST No. 51, at 322 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
215. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).

216. Id.
217. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("No man is
allowed to be judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment,
and not improbably, corrupt his integrity." Id.).

